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Public-Private Partnerships 
(PPPs) and the Road to Self-




The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956, under Schedule A, reserved 
17 industries including arms and ammunition for the public sector.1 
Accordingly, the defence sector remained solely the domain of defence 
Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs), Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) 
and  Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) till 
2001. However, the country had to resort to the import of ammunition 
for the Bofors artillery guns during the Kargil War from South Africa, 
amongst others, even though the country already had a large industrial 
base consisting of nine defence PSUs, 39 Ordnance Factories (OFs) 
and 52 laboratories of DRDO. The armed forces stared at the perils of 
dependence on imports during the war. On a positive note, post the 
Kargil War, the government decided to open the doors to the defence 
sector to the private industry. Thus, in May 2001, the government 
permitted 100 per cent participation by the Indian private sector, subject 
to licensing, with the aim to galvanise the country’s defence industrial 
base for achieving self-reliance and indigenisation.2
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A strong defence industrial base assures enhanced security due to 
various valid reasons. Reduced dependence on foreign imports, the 
opportunity to create Intellectual Property (IP) and development of 
domestic technological capabilities which may have significant civil 
applications, are some of the obvious advantages of a strong defence 
industrial base. Besides, it encourages fair competition, promotes quality 
and provides a platform to tap export markets.
In view of this, the paper will discuss the following: the need to 
encourage Public Private Partnerships (PPPs); their advantages and 
disadvantages; the issues that remain to be tackled; the steps already 
taken by the government; and, finally, it will recommend measures to 
encourage the domestic private industry’s participation in the defence 
sector in general and PPPs in particular.
How is India Meeting its Current Defence Arms/ 
Equipment Requirements?
Largest Arms Importer: India wore the unenvious crown of being the 
largest importer of weapons and equipment and accounted for 12 per cent 
(by value) of all global arms imports for the five-year period from 2013 
to 2017.3 The quantum of defence imports, however, has come down 
significantly, for the years 2017 and 2018. The latest report on “Arms 
Trade” by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 
places India at 4th rank for the year 2018, behind Saudi Arabia, Australia 
and China, among the highest importers of arms. India’s share in the 
overall global defence imports for the period 2014-18 is pegged at 9.5 
per cent,4 which is still not a desirable state. As per defence manufacturing 
statistics maintained by the Indian government, approximately 60 per 
cent of all capital procurements are ex-import.5
A chart depicting India’s defence imports, based on Trend Indicator 
Values (TIVs) accorded by SIPRI, for the period from 2013-18, is as 
under:
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Fig 1: India’s Defence Imports (2013-18)
Source: SIPRI, 2018.6
Note: *The TIVs, used by SIPRI, are based on the known unit production costs of weapons 
and represent the transfer of military resources rather than the financial value of the arms 
transfers.
The industry is dominated by defence PSUs and OFs. These 
two together contribute about 90 per cent of the total domestic 
manufacturing output.7 However, the production capacity of these public 
sector enterprises is not sufficient to meet the requirements of the armed 
forces in the contracted delivery timelines. Of the overall indigenous 
defence production, the private sector currently contributes a minor 
share, especially in the capital procurement. There is, thus, a strong case 
to further encourage Indian private industry to participate in the defence 
sector and enhance India’s defence industrial base. PPPs in defence 
comprise one of the viable and credible options to provide a helping hand 
to the domestic private industry and enable it to contribute effectively in 
pursuit of India’s stated goal to achieve self-reliance in defence.
What is a PPP?
A PPP is a contract—often a long-term contract—between a government 
entity and a private entity(ies), most often a corporation(s). The goal of 
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the partnership is to provide public benefit, either an asset or a service. A 
key element of these contracts is that the private entity must make a certain 
amount of investment and take on a significant portion of the risk. The 
remuneration that the private entity receives for participation, as specified 
in the contract, would primarily depend on its overall performance.
Why are PPPs Required in the Defence Sector?
  Requirement of Resources: The defence sector needs an immense 
amount of resources. Herein lies the significance of the economics of 
PPPs in the defence sector. It is widely acknowledged that inadequate 
infrastructure reduces production capacity which, in turn, causes 
delays in meeting the required delivery timelines, raises per unit 
cost and makes product(s) less competitive. The resources that are 
required need substantial investments from private industry to build 
better infrastructure than what is feasible under an initiative that is 
wholly public or wholly private and improve upon existing capacities/ 
capabilities and sustain them.





Source: Prepared by the author.
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Positives of PPP: Some of the positives, in addition to the ones 
discussed above are as under: 
  The PPP is a time-tested concept. It is widely acknowledged that the 
private industry brings with it investment, experience and dynamism. 
Besides, the inputs of the private entity during the consultation phase, 
may assist to keep the expectations from the proposed project, realistic.
  In the partnership, each participant is assigned the task that it does 
best. Hence, innovation and desired quality standards are likely to 
be achieved during the life-cycle of the project when the public and 
private entities work together. Speedy project completion is assured, 
as ‘time-to-complete’ the project would most likely be incorporated 
as a parameter for performance measurement.
  The project feasibility studies ensure that all related risks are analysed 
and deliberated upon in adequate detail. The operational and project 
execution risks may be shared between the entities, as agreeable to 
both parties. 
Negatives of PPP: Some of the negatives are discussed as under: 
  Every PPP involves a certain level of risk for the private entity and it 
logically expects to be compensated for accepting those risks. This 
may have an adverse impact, leading to cost escalation of the project, 
if the expected compensation is on the higher side.
  Reasonably accurate assessment of the proposed costs of the project 
may become a matter of debate, if the expertise for execution/
fructification lies with the private entity. Besides, in cases wherein, 
there are very few private entities that can perform the specified tasks, 
the lack of competition for cost-effective partnering is likely to hinder 
a better price discovery.
  The assessed benefits from the projects are likely to vary, depending 
on the risk, complexity, technology sought, competitive level and the 
size/volume of the project. 
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Major Projects Undertaken  
with Private Sector Participation
Indian industry, both public and private, has collaborated successfully and 
proved its ability to deliver the desired results, in spite of global sanctions 
imposed in the aftermath of the Pokhran nuclear tests conducted in May 
1998, in the fields of missile technology, space explorations and some 
defence projects. Some of the notable projects undertaken for defence are 
briefly discussed as under:
  Pinaka Multi-Barrel Rocket Launch (MBRL) System: Development 
of the Pinaka MBRL commenced in 1986 at a DRDO facility known 
as the Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE) 
based in Pune. DRDO was responsible for the overall design and 
development. The sub-systems and components were developed by 
Tata Power Strategic Engineering Division (SED), Larsen & Toubro 
(L&T) and OFB.8 The weapon system is already in service with the 
Indian Army and is a fine example of partnership between the public 
and private enterprises.
  Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS): The ATAGS 
(155 mm x 52 calibres) was started in 2013 by DRDO to replace 
the older guns in service in the Indian Army with a modern 155 
mm artillery gun. The Armament Research and Development 
Establishment (ARDE) partnered with the Kalyani Group, Tata 
Power SED and OFB for this purpose.9 It proved that India has the 
indigenous design and development capability for artillery guns. The 
OFB won the tender to manufacture the gun barrels, along with the 
forgings experts, the Kalyani Group. Mahindra Defence Systems will 
make the recoil system along with Tata Power SED, while Punj Lloyd 
will make the muzzle brake. During full-scale manufacture, an entire 
ecosystem of smaller Tier-2 and Tier-3 suppliers is expected to come 
up.10 During the trial stage, the prototype fired 48 km in the Pokhran 
ranges, creating a record.11 The Defence Acquisition Council has 
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approved procurement of the gun for the Indian Army and it has 
since been introduced into the Army. 
  Akash (Air Defence System): The Akash Surface-to-Air Missile 
(SAM) system, a part of the Integrated Guided Missile Development 
Programme (IGMDP) was produced by Bharat Electronics (BEL). 
Bharat Dynamics (BDL) serves as the nodal agency for the Akash 
SAMs’ production for the Army. A number of DRDO labs are 
involved in the development of the Akash. Launcher systems were 
provided by Tata Power and Larsen & Toubro.12 The equipment has 
been successfully inducted in the Indian Air Force (IAF) and Indian 
Army (IA). Akash is the outcome of a successful partnership between 
the Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL), the 
nodal lab in DRDO, along with 13 other DRDO labs, 19 Public 
Sector Units (PSUs), 5 OFs, 3 national laboratories, 6 academic 
institutions and more than 265 private industries across the country.13
  Missile Development Programme: India’s missile development 
programme is completely indigenous. Under the leadership of Dr APJ 
Abdul Kalam, then Director, DRDL, the indigenous development of 
a series of missiles was progressed by the DRDO. The Integrated 
Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) included five missiles 
viz. the Agni, Prithvi, Akash, Trishul and Nag. The project was 
accorded approval by the Government of India on July 26, 1983, and 
was completed in March 2012.14 The ambitious time-bound project 
brought together the scientific community, academic institutions, 
Research and Development (R&D) laboratories, industries and the 
armed forces in giving shape to the strategic missile development 
programme.15
  Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas: The LCA was designed and 
developed by the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) with 
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) as the principal partner, 
along with DRDO, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 
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(CSIR), BEL, Directorate General of Aeronautical Quality Assurance 
(DG AQA), Indian Air Force (IAF) and Indian Navy (IN).16 Thirty-
three R&D establishments, 60 major industries and 11 academic 
institutions participated in the project.17 On January 17, 2015, the 
IAF got its first indigenously built LCA Tejas, Series Production-1 
(SP1), which was handed over by the then Defence Minister, the 
late Mr Manohar Parrikar, to the Indian Air Force in Bengaluru. 
Raksha Rajya Mantri Dr. Subhash Bhamre, in a written reply, stated 
in the Rajya Sabha on December 31, 2018, that out of 16 Initial 
Operational Clearance (IOC) fighter aircraft, 10 fighters have been 
delivered by HAL and are operational with the IAF’s 45 Squadron.18 
The remaining 6 IOC fighter aircraft were to be delivered in 2019.
  Samyukta (Early Warning System): The Samyukta, a mobile 
integrated electronic warfare system, was jointly developed by the 
DRDO, DRDL, Instrument Research & Development Establishment 
(IRDE), Electronics & Radar Development Establishment (LRDE),19 
Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), Electronics Corporation of India 
Limited (ECIL),20 Tata Power SED and the Corps of Signals of the 
Indian Army. Nearly 40 small companies developed components 
indigenously for the system.21 It was delivered to the Indian Army 
in 2004. 
  INS Arihant [Ship Submersible Ballistic, Nuclear (SSBN) 
Submarine]: The INS Arihant is the lead ship of India’s Arihant 
class of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. The 6,000-
ton vessel was built under the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) 
project at the Ship Building Centre in the port city of Visakhapatnam. 
The project was launched in 1997 and was jointly developed by the 
Indian Navy, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and DRDO 
at the naval dockyard in Visakhapatnam. Russian designers assisted 
in building the vessel. Domestic private companies involved in the 
development of the submarine were Tata Power, a division of Tata 
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Group; L&T, and Walchandnagar Industries.22 The submarine was 
successfully delivered under the PPP model and commissioned in the 
Indian Navy in August 2016.
  Launch Vehicle for Nirbhay Missile System: Nirbhay, a sub-sonic 
cruise missile which is under trial, is launched from the LPTA 5252-
12 x 12, an all-terrain and all-wheel drive mobile launch vehicle. The 
launcher was developed jointly by Tatas in close coordination with 
the Vehicles Research and Development Establishment (VRDE) at 
Vahannagar.23
Issues 
Despite the successful partnerships between public and private entities, 
as discussed above, the general impression in the environment is that the 
government/Ministry of Defence (MoD), instead of encouraging PPP, 
has avoided it because of perceived “security” related issues. It is also 
perceived that Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) was nominated for all 
Integrated Early Warning (EW) projects, primarily for “security” reasons.
Approximately 30-35 per cent of the Buy (Indian) capital acquisitions 
of Rs 52,700 crore in the last three years has been based on the nomination 
of government enterprises. Nomination may be considered akin to 
rewarding inefficiency against merit based competition.
Today, many Indian companies viz Tata Group, Reliance Group, 
Mahindra, L&T, Ashok Leyland amongst others, can be categorised as 
truly global companies. In defence also, these companies are capable 
of collaborating with futuristic technology players abroad, to meet the 
requirements of the Indian armed forces and be a part of the global 
supply chain, if ‘fair competition’ and a ‘level playing field’ are ensured. 
Considering the same, the following issues gain significance:
  Competence Mapping: With that grant of 353 industrial licences24 
to the private industry for defence manufacturing between 2001 to 
2018, competence mapping, in terms of both capability and capacity 
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of the domestic defence companies, becomes essential. Further, due 
to the rapid scientific and technological developments worldwide, 
there is a growing volume of defence weapons and equipment 
technology that can potentially impact and be incorporated in design, 
development and manufacturing capability of the domestic defence 
industry. Competence mapping of the Indian private industry 
engaged in the defence sector has not yet been carried out.
  Lack of Effective Implementation of Public Procurement Policy 
for Medium, Small and Micro Enterprises (MSMEs): The Public 
Procurement Policy Order, 2012 has been notified under Section 11 
of the MSME Act, 2006. The policy become effective from April 1, 
2012 (Gazette notification on March 26, 2012). For the ministry/
department/central PSUs, the overall procurement goal of minimum 
20 per cent has become mandatory from April 1, 2015.25 The 
procurement of defence products from MSEs needs to be encouraged 
to facilitate the MSMEs participation in defence manufacturing. 
  Participation in ‘Buy and Make’ Category Procurement: The 
‘Buy & Make’ category refers to an initial procurement of equipment 
in Fully Formed (FF) state or otherwise, in a specified quantity from 
a foreign vendor.26 This would be followed by indigenous production 
by an Indian Production Agency (PA) selected by the foreign vendor 
and would involve Transfer of Technology (ToT) in accordance 
with the contract. An Indian company cannot field a system, jointly 
developed abroad with a foreign partner, under this category. It is, 
however, noted that the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP-
2016) allows an Indian company to participate in the Buy (Global) 
category. Similarly, the Indian company should, logically, be permitted 
to participate in the acquisition proposals categorised as ‘Buy and 
Make’.
  Applicability of Simulation Trials: In the ‘Buy (Global)’/‘Buy and 
Make’ category procurements, there may be cases where trials need 
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to be conducted abroad in the vendors’ premises. If field evaluation 
is not feasible, the goverment/MoD may explore the possibility of 
conducting evaluation through computer simulation, and suitable 
options are recommended for approval by the Services Capital 
Acquisition Plan Categorisation Higher Committee (SCAPCHC)/
Defence Procurement Board (DPB)/Defence Acquisition Council 
(DAC).27 In such cases, the government accepts the simulation trials. 
For example, the land based Medium Range Surface-to-Air Missile 
(MRSAM), a Government-to-Government (G-to-G) development 
project, for joint development and production by the DRDO, India 
and IAI (Israel Aerospace Industries), Israel, was contracted, based 
on the simulation trial, while the missile was still being developed. 
The scenarios were simulated utilising the Meggitt BTT-3 “Banshee” 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV).28 The contract for the land-based 
MR-SAM worth Rs 10,075.68 crore was inked on February 27, 
2009.29 However, the facility of simulation trials is not available to 
the Indian vendors, which gives a negative signal to the environment.
  Participation as Single Vendor: If an Indian company buys the 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) for critical technology abroad and 
wishes to field a product for procurement by the Indian armed forces; 
it is highly unlikely, under a “single vendor situation”. The feasibility 
of an Indian company (other than a defence PSU) to become a 
single vendor supplier to the Indian armed forces is very low. Even 
if the Indian private company buys the technology and creates the 
infrastructure, there is extremely low feasibility to sell the systems to 
the Indian armed forces in a single vendor case. Such cases will be 
rare, yet the aspect of psychological impact cannot be ignored.
  Unfavourable Tax Structure: The structure in the case of taxes 
and duties is unfavourable for the domestic defence industry. The 
finished weapons and equipment, when imported, attract zero taxes 
and duties. On the contrary, if a semi-finished product is imported 
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and any value addition in India is effected, the value addition would 
attract the General Services Tax (GST). Therefore, with the reduction 
of the import content and corresponding increase in the indigenous 
content, the cost of the equipment is likely to be higher due to the 
levy of GST on the indigenous content. 
  Lack of Flexibility in Procedures: The implementation of 
procedures is carried out very rigidly. One of the reasons for the 
same is attributed to following the rule book in both letter and spirit. 
While emphasis on transparency and probity is vital, lack of flexibility 
in the procedures and their implementation causes unforgivable 
delays, sometimes to the tune of years, in procurement of munitions, 
critical weapons and equipment that have a direct bearing on the 
preparedness of the defence forces. In place of the stipulated period 
of 76 weeks, a majority of the capital procurement cases drag on for 
four to five years, whereafter the contract may be signed. A case in 
point is the delay in the conclusion of the contract for the Medium 
Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) by India. This case was 
initiated in 2007 and the Rafale was chosen in 2012, over rival offers 
from the United States, Europe and Russia. India finally signed an 
inter-governmental agreement with France in September 2016.30
  Idle Infrastructure: Sustenance of the private defence industry needs 
consistent orders either from own defence forces or friendly foreign 
countries. In case, the orders are not received, the infrastructure 
created to manufacture the weapon system/equipment would lie idle 
and the entire effort would get wasted. For instance, the complete 
quantity of the Pinaka Multi-Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL) as 
contracted by the Indian Army has already been delivered by L&T, as 
stated by Mr. J D Patil, a whole-time Director, and Senior Executive 
Vice President for L&T’s Defence Business, during a seminar on 
‘Defence Technology in India’ organised by the Delhi Policy Group 
in March 2019. Unless the system is permitted to be exported to 
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friendly foreign countries or more fresh orders are placed by own 
defence forces, the infrastructure created would remain unutilised. 
Issues already Resolved by the Government
Some of the issues that were identified in consultation with all the 
stakeholders and already stand resolved by the government are discussed 
as under:
  Withdrawal of Excise Duty Exemption: Exemption of excise duty 
to all defence PSUs and ordnance factories was withdrawn by the 
government with effect from June 1, 2015 to establish a level playing 
field between the Indian private and public sectors.31 As per the 
revised policy, all Indian industries (public and private) are subjected 
to the same kind of excise duty levies. 
  Distribution Among More than One Vendor in Same 
Procurement: The distribution of the order/quantity among more 
than one vendor in the same development project/procurement case, 
during acquisition of a weapon/equipment/product, is now being 
carried out, provided the parameters pertaining to cost and quality 
are fulfilled. Such a criterion is laid out in the Request for Proposal 
(RFP) itself.32 For instance, the DRDO Advanced Towed Artillery 
Gun System (ATAGS), a towed 155 mm/52 calibre howitzer, has 
been developed for the Indian Army as a joint project of two private-
sector corporations, Tata Power SED and Kalyani Group.33
  Effort to Reduce Nomination: Defence PSUs are now required to 
compete with other vendors for capital acquisition projects. Hence, 
the issue of nomination has been resolved to an extent. For instance, 
in all the projects related to modernisation of infrastructure (turnkey 
projects), initiated since 2014 for the Army Ordnance Corps echelons 
and certain Army Base Workshops of the Corps of Electronics and 
Mechanical Engineers, various private firms, including Xplorer 
Limited, Mahindra Defence Systems amongst others and MECON 
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(Metallurgical & Engineering Consultants) Limited, a Public Sector 
Undertaking (PSU) under the Ministry of Steel of the Government 
of India, participated under similar terms and conditions. While in 
the various previous turnkey projects, MECON Limited was selected 
as consultants on nomination basis, the current emphasis is on fair 
competition among all public and private sector enterprises. Thus, a 
deliberate effort has been made to reduce the nomination of public 
enterprises in certain areas of capital procurements. 
  Sharing of Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap 
(TPCR): In line with the recommendations from the industry, the 
TPCR-2018 has been placed in the open domain to provide to the 
industry an overview of equipment that is envisaged to be inducted into 
the Indian armed forces up to the late 2020s.34 The intention is to drive 
and guide the technology development process that the industry may like 
to pursue. This roadmap would assist the industry in planning or initiating 
technology development, partnerships and production arrangements in 
line with the ‘Make in India’ initiative of the government. 
  Sharing of List of Make Projects: Lists of weapons/equipment, to 
meet current and futuristic requirements of the armed forces, proposed 
to be developed under Chapter III, ‘Make-I’ (government funded) 
procedure under the provisions of DPP-2016, are placed in the open 
domain for sharing with the industry by the Indian Army, Navy and 
Air Force. For instance, the list of products required by the Army, to 
include the Future Ready Combat Vehicle (FRCV), 3rd generation 
missiles for the 125 mm gun barrels of the T-72 and T-90 tanks and 
advanced/new generation 30 mm ammunition for the BMP-2/2K, 
is readily available on the Indian Army’s website.35 However, analysis 
reveals that details like the expected initial order quantity, annual/
recurring requirement, period for which the product is likely to be in 
service, anticipated cost per item, etc., are not indicated against each 
product. Sharing of these details and any additional information, as 
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deemed appropriate, would be of much assistance to the industry to 
decide their strategy to participate in these projects. In February 2018, 
the government notified a separate, simplified procedure for sub-
category ‘Make-II’ (industry funded) which has many industry friendly 
provisions. The projects under Make-II are divided into two categories, 
that is, projects that stand ‘Approved-in-Principle (AIP)’ as per the new 
‘Make-II’ procedure and being progressed for accord of Acceptance of 
Necessity (AoN) by the defence forces Headquarters (HQ); and the 
projects which are at the exploratory stages for which the process of a 
preliminary feasibility study is in progress. The list of these projects has 
been placed by the government in the open domain.36
  Identification of Imported Components for Indigenisation 
m The identification of imported components of existing in-service 
weapons/equipment for indigenisation, to include assemblies, 
sub-assemblies and spares, is already being carried out by the 
defence forces and a significant range of items has been indigenised 
by the Directorate of Indigenisation (DoI) at the Integrated HQ 
of the MoD (Army) and the respective Directorates of the Navy 
and Air Force. 
m The DRDO has identified 100 components of the LCA to be 
indigenised by the domestic private industry. These components 
are currently being imported.37
m More such items are required to be identified and comprehensive 
lists prepared. The lists of items and quantities so identified, less 
items classified as confidential, should be placed in the open 
domain/shared with the industry to enable them to avail the 
opportunity to indigenise them. 
The Road Ahead
The government has taken some path-breaking policy decisions for ease of 
doing business and creating a suitable environment for the participation 
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of the private industry in the defence sector. Withdrawal of excise duty 
exemption to public enterprises, enhanced Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) in defence, promulgation of the strategy for defence exports, 
streamlining of procedures for the grant of industrial licences, guidelines 
for the formation of JVs (Joint Ventures), streamlining the procedure 
for the imposition of penalties on erring entities are some of the major 
decisions that have definitely played a pivotal role in encouraging the 
private sector’s participation in the defence sector. However, much 
ground still needs to be covered to provide a ‘truly level playing field’ 
to the private industry in defence manufacturing. Certain measures 
recommended to be implemented to encourage PPP in the defence sector 
are discussed as under:
  Aim at Long-Term Sustenance of Defence Industrial Base 
(DIB): The government needs to aim at long-term sustenance of the 
DIB for achieving self-reliance in defence in the foreseeable future. 
Participation of the domestic private industry, in both partnership with 
public enterprises and individually or in joint ventures with foreign 
industry, is vital for a vibrant and robust DIB. The government also 
needs to acknowledge that there is a consistent requirement of supply 
orders for maintaining the capacity and sustenance of the defence 
industry.
  Investment in R&D in Defence Technology Projects: Investment 
in R&D in defence technology projects by the private industry 
needs to be encouraged. Since such investments may not yield 
immediate results and profits, hand-holding would be necessary. 
The development of strategic capabilities should be completely 
government funded. The government could also consider financing 
of R&D in defence technology projects by the private industry in 
the stand-alone or PPP mode. Wide publicity should be given for 
financing/subsidising of R&D projects for defence. The recipients 
could be research institutes, private enterprises, MSMEs and other 
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eligible organisations. All decisions regarding financing of research 
should be taken by a collegiate (headed by defence officers with all the 
stakeholders as members) rather than routing on files that are prone 
to the personal biases of individual appointments in the bureaucratic 
chain. A non-lapsable corpus of Rs 1,000 crore should be earmarked 
for the same. 
  Flexibility in Procedures: While rigidity in procurement procedures 
provides a semblance of transparency and fairness in defence 
acquisitions, a certain degree of flexibility, while maintaining the desired 
levels of transparency and probity, would go a long way in curtailing 
procedural delays and expediting capital procurements. Amendments 
to the procedures to include the following may be considered:
m Permit the Indian private company that buys critical IPR 
abroad to field a product under a “single vendor situation”. If 
the Indian vendor gets the technology and creates the entire 
value chain and infrastructure, it should be allowed to become 
a single vendor supplier and offer/sell systems to the Indian 
defence forces.
m Allow Indian private companies to field a system jointly developed 
abroad for NC NC (No Cost, No Commitment) trials under 
the ‘Buy and Make’ category. When the DPP permits an Indian 
company to participate in the ‘Buy (Global)’ category, it should 
also be allowed to participate in a ‘Buy and Make’ project.
m Accept simulation trials for equipment under development by an 
Indian company, if NC NC trials are not feasible. It would be in 
line with the facility being provided to foreign companies.
m The unfavourable structure, in the case of taxes and duties 
on domestic defence industry, needs to be corrected without 
delay. Suitable incentives should be provided for an enhanced 
percentage of indigenous content, to encourage indigenisation 
and value addition by the domestic defence industry. 
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  Stop Nomination and Ensure Fair Internal Competition: 
Nomination is akin to promoting and rewarding inefficiency 
in government owned enterprises. Nominations for all defence 
procurements and research projects should cease forthwith. Let there 
be fair competition among all the interested vendors, whether from 
public or private sector.
  Appoint a Cost Regulator: An independent cost regulator, as 
recommended by the Aatre Task Force, should be established for 
strategic partnership projects.38 It would act as an immense confidence 
building measure and encourage the private industry to invest in the 
defence sector.
  Implement Effectively Public Procurement Policy for MSMEs: 
The Public Procurement Policy, mandating 20 percent procurement by 
ministries/departments, should be sincerely implemented for defence 
products (assemblies, sub-assemblies, spares, etc.). This is essential to 
encourage MSMEs’ participation in defence manufacturing.
  Reserve Government Line of Credit for Defence Products: The 
government line of credit should be reserved for export of Indian 
made defence products. Further, the line of credit to friendly foreign 
countries should be enhanced to generate a demand for the weapons 
and equipment manufactured in India.
  List Specified Projects for PPP: The government, in consultation 
with the defence forces, should identify weapons and equipment 
that can be developed under PPP to include both Make-I and 
Make-II projects. A list of such projects should be shared with the 
industry and placed in the open domain. A positive beginning has 
already been made as the Army, Navy and Air Force have listed 
out ‘Make’ projects, with details, on the MoD website. The MoD 
has listed Make-II projects on its website and the defence forces 
have nominated nodal officers for these projects. There is also a 
requirement to get Make-I effectively functional by launching more 
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projects under this category. The project lists are recommended to 
be revised on a monthly basis to further add additional projects/
requirements that may crop up. The step would instill confidence in 
the domestic private industry and encourage it to invest in defence 
industry in a big way.
  Carry out Competence Mapping: There is a need to carry out 
competence mapping of domestic private vendors to assess their 
capability and capacity. A study group/committee to identify 
competencies, assess their impact in the next two decades and 
indicate the level of confidence in predicting the outcome may be 
considered. The committee could have representation from the 
industry. Competence mapping would be of immense value in short 
listing of domestic private companies for strategic long-term defence 
projects under PPP and would reflect the degree of clarity with which 
the outcomes can reliably be predicted.
  Create Venture Fund to Finance Start-ups: The government needs 
to take a lead and create a venture fund (investment banks and/or other 
financial institutions) to carry out institutional investment into early-
stage/start-up companies (new ventures). Finance provided to start-up 
companies and small businesses in the defence sector that are expected to 
have long-term growth potential, is likely to enthuse young entrepreneurs 
to delve into defence design, development and manufacturing. 
  R&D Corpus Fund: The R&D corpus fund should be fully utilised 
for indigenous development of complex systems and advanced 
technologies by the private industry. Targets need to be set and sincere 
efforts made to achieve them. Under-utilisation of the R&D corpus 
fund is a sore point that should be addressed on priority. The procedure 
to be followed for grant of funds from the government for R&D in the 
defence sector, should be available ‘on-line’ and given wide publicity. 
  Indicate Business Volume and Numbers: The government, in 
consultation with the defence forces, should indicate the approximate 
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business volume and numbers for weapons and equipment that are 
planned to be procured in the future. It would be logical for the 
government to enter into long-term business agreements with the 
private industry for continued orders and thereby mitigate uncertainty 
that currently envelops the defence sector.
  End User Accessibility: The private industry has indicated in various 
forums the need for greater accessibility to the end users i.e. the defence 
forces. In the case of the Army, the issue has been addressed to a 
certain extent by the establishment of the Army Design Bureau (ADB). 
However, the access to individual user directorates is largely restricted. 
There is, thus, a need to evolve institutionalised mechanisms to facilitate 
more frequent interactions to enable the private industry to understand 
the future requirements of the defence forces and plan accordingly.
  Department of Defence Production (DDP) to Facilitate PPPs: 
The DDP should act as a facilitating agency and encourage the defence 
PSUs, OFB and DRDO to enter into JVs/PPPs for co-development 
and co-production of modern technology weapons, equipment and 
munitions.
Conclusion 
Self-reliance in the defence sector can be achieved only when the 
domestic private industry makes substantial investments in the design, 
development and manufacturing of modern technology weapons and 
equipment. PPPs in the defence sector comprise an effective mechanism 
to progress rapidly on the road to achieve self-reliance and indigenisation. 
PPPs should essentially involve long-term strategic ventures and focus on 
modern technology. The relationship with the private industry should 
shift from the ‘seller’ to the ‘partner’ and the partnerships should make 
an endeavour to address both Indian and global requirements. 
The government should state unambiguously its readiness to absorb/ 
minimise risk(s) and act as a guide, facilitator, insurer and under-writer 
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of the last resort. India needs to unhesitatingly leverage the financial and 
techno acumen of the private industry, encourage PPPs and employ them 
as strategic tools for expanding indigenous design, development and 
manufacturing capability in the coveted defence sector.
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